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REVERSING THE “TRAGEDY” OF THE COMMONS? SUSTAINABLE 
MANAGEMENT AND THE COMMONS ACT 2006 
 
Christopher Rodgers1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Commons Act 2006 is the first statute since the Commons Registration Act 1965 
to address the problems associated with the management of common land in England 
and Wales. A key focus for the 2006 Act is the introduction of mechanisms for the 
sustainable management of common land, including self regulatory commons 
councils. This article examines the ‘sustainable’ management of common land in 
historical and contemporary perspective. It sets the 2006 Act, and the sustainable 
management of common land, in the wider context of the ongoing debate triggered by 
Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ and subsequent institutional and post-
institutional scholarship on common pool resource management. It uses historical and 
qualitative research data drawn from three case studies to demonstrate the irrelevance 
of Hardin’s thesis in an English context, and identifies the Commons Registration Act 
of 1965 as the true ‘tragedy’ of the English and Welsh commons. The case studies 
also illustrate the challenges posed by the introduction of legal mechanisms to 
promote the ecologically sustainable management of the modern commons, and 
inform the critique of the Commons Act 2006 developed in the article. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Commons Act 2006 is the first statute to address the management of common 
land in England and Wales since the Commons Registration Act 1965. It seeks to 
provide a regulatory framework for the sustainable management of the commons, 
through reforms to the registers established under the 1965 Act, and the establishment 
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Newcastle University.This paper draws on research funded by the AHRC under 
project AH/E510310/1, ‘Contested Common Land: environmental governance, law and sustainable 
land management c.1600-2006’, part of the AHRC Landscape and Environment programme. 
I am grateful to Angus Winchester for the historical references in footnotes 31-34: and for his, Eleanor 
Straughton’s, Ole Pedersen’s and Julia Aglionby’s comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
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of self regulatory commons councils2. This article has two objectives. It will set the 
management of common land in historical perspective, and consider in particular the 
impact of the Commons Registration Act 1965 on  principles capturing ‘sustainable’ 
commons management that were formerly expressed through common law rules. 
Secondly, it will consider how sustainable management objectives are expressed in 
modern public policy, and how the reforms in the Commons Act 2006 will assist their 
successful implementation. It will conclude by contextualising the English Law on 
commons governance within the wider debate on the institutional governance of 
common pool resources. These themes will be illustrated by historical and 
contemporary research data drawn from three case studies of upland commons in 
England and Wales: Eskdale (Cumbria), Ingleborough (North Yorkshire) and 
Cwmdeuddwr common (Powys)3.  
 
COMONS MANAGEMENT IN CONTEXT 
 
The ‘tragedy’ thesis and commons governance 
 
Garrett Hardin’s influential thesis on the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 4 argued that the 
incentive to put private gain before the common good meant that common pool 
resources are inherently subject to a tendency to degradation leading to ‘ruin to all’5. 
As this paper will demonstrate, Hardin’s thesis has no application to common land in 
England and Wales. It is based on a false premise, namely that there is unrestricted 
access to common pasture and other common land resources. Access to the resources 
supplied by common land in England and Wales, and the manner in which they are 
used, have both been the subject of extensive regulation since the medieval period.  
 
                                                 
2
 Implementation of Part 1 of the Act (Registration) is currently the subject of a pilot exercise in seven 
local authority registration districts: Devon, Kent, Cornwall, Hertfordshire, Herefordshire, Lancashire 
(excluding Blackpool) and Blackburn with Darwen (see the Commons Registration (England) 
Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1961). If successful, Part 1 will be implemented on a rolling basis from 
October 2010,with all commons registration authorities covered by October 31st 2013 . Part 2 of the 
2006 Act (commons councils) will be implemented in stages to be determined from 2010. 
3
 AHRC project AH/E510310/1 used four case studies to examine the sustainable governance of 
common land in historical context, from the early modern period to the passing of the Commons Act 
2006. The fourth was the North Norfolk grazing marshes at Brancaster and Thornham. For further 
information, historical working papers and qualitative research data generated by the project, see the 
project website: http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies.   
4
 G.Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162 (1968) pp1243-8 
5
 Ibid at 1244. 
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Hardin’s thesis has also been challenged by institutional writers, who have stressed 
the wider effectiveness of self regulating common pool resource institutions6. 
Ostrom’s influential work, for example, posited eight ‘design principles’ that are 
displayed by successful common pool resource institutions,7 and new-institutional 
writers have also stressed the inherent reflexivity of institutions for the management 
of common pool resources8. Reflexive institutionalism stresses the interdependence of 
institutionally-mediated ideas and interests on the one hand, and those originating 
from individual appropriators on the other, and thereby emphasises the robustness of 
collective management institutions and their capacity to influence actors’ behaviour9. 
New-institutionalist scholars have also stressed the importance of property rights for 
the success of common pool resource management i.e. property institutions 
conceptualised as a set of rules defining access to a common resource and exclusion 
from its management and use, while also monitoring, sanctioning and arbitrating the 
behaviour of individual users10. They have stressed the inherent reflexivity of property 
rights institutions, which are shaped by individual actors, while at the same time 
contributing to the managerial behaviour of resource appropriators. 
  
Far from suffering a ‘tragedy of the commons’ in Hardin’s sense, common land in 
England and Wales was, prior to the Commons Registration Act 1965, subject to 
                                                 
6
 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: the evolution of institutions for collective 
action (Cambridge University Press 1990). 
7
 For example, the ability of individuals affected by operational rules to participate in their 
modification, the application of monitoring by appropriators, of graduated sanctions for violation of 
appropriation rules, and the application of low cost dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
between resource appropriators. See Ostrom, Governing the Commons ibid at pp.90-91. 
8
 For further elaboration of the institutional approach see: Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, E.. “Collective 
Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal” in (2001) 29 
Politics and Society 485-514; Agrawal, A.  “Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: 
Context, Methods, and Politics” in (2003) 32 Annual Review of Anthropology  243-262; Dietz, T., 
Dolsak, N., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.  “The Drama of the Commons” in Ostrom, E., Dietz, T, Dolsak, 
N., Stern, P.C., Stonich, S. and Weber, E. U. (Eds) The Drama of the Commons: Committee on the 
Human Dimensions of Global Change. (2002 Washington: National Academy Press) Pp. 3-35 ; Gibbs, 
C.J.N. and Bromley, D.W.  “Institutional Arrangements for Management of Rural Resources: 
Common-Property Regimes” in Berkes, F. (Ed) Common Property Resources: Ecology and 
community-based sustainable development. (1989 London: Belhaven Press) Pp. 22-32; Ostrom, E.  
“Coping with tragedies of the commons” in (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science  493-535; 
Ostrom, E., Dietz, T, Dolsak, N., Stern, P.C., Stonich, S. and Weber, E. U. (Eds). The Drama of the 
Commons: Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change (2002 Washington: National 
Academy Press). 
9
 See for example: Dedeuwaerdere, T. 2002. “Biological diversity protection and self-regulation of 
local communities. Some implications of a reflexive institutionalist approach”.  
at: http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00000635/00/biodiv_and_refl_self-reg.PDF  
10
 See Schlager, E. & Ostrom, E. “Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: a conceptual 
analysis” in (1992) 68 Land Economics 249-262. 
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common law principles of customary origin that promoted ‘sustainable’ 
management11. These were expressed through property rights, in the form of 
qualifications on the resource use conferred by property entitlements, and were 
administered by local manor courts in a manner that met, in most material respects, 
Ostrom’s design principles for the successful management of common pool 
resources12.  Moreover, the administration of customary rules by the manor courts 
represented a wholly different means for organising the management of common 
resources than the model posited by Hardin, which stresses the need for exclusive 
ownership by either individuals or government in order to promote the effective 
management of the resource13.  
 
The management principles applied by manorial institutions were not expressed in 
terms of the ‘sustainable’ management of the common land resource. This reflects the 
fact that the focus of common law discourse is on rights and remedies, with which the 
notions of intergenerational equity and futurity implicit in sustainable development sit 
uneasily14. There is ample evidence, however, that until their demise in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the manor courts administered a sophisticated system of land 
use regulation that fulfilled many, but not all, of the objectives that modern 
environment policy now seeks for the sustainable management of common land.  
Sustainable management is primarily concerned with balancing the different impacts 
of land use (economic, social and ecological) in a manner that is targeted towards 
achieving sustainable development15. A key focus for sustainable management is 
therefore on balancing the needs of current and future users of the resource, and this 
raises issues of intergenerational equity and the need to preserve essential economic 
                                                 
11
 Section 128 and Schedule 12 Law of Property Act 1922 abolished copyhold tenure, and in so doing 
also abolished the last remaining means of acquiring common rights by custom. The impact of the 
Commons Registration Act 1965 on the management principles derived from customary practice  are 
discussed below. 
12
 See generally De Moor, Shaw-Taylor and Warde, “Conclusion”  in (De Moor, Shaw-Taylor and 
Warde eds.) The Management of Common Land in North West Europe c.1500-1850 (Comparative 
Rural History of the North Sea Area Publication No.8, Brepols, Belgium, 2002). 
13
 See Carol Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public 
Property”, (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 711 at 742-743. 
14
 See M. Stallworthy, Sustainability, Land Use and the Environment: a legal analysis (Cavendish 
Publishing, 2002) paras. 1.2 and 2.4.  
15
 See, for example, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration: From our Origins to the Future,  the 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002, esp. Para 5. 
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resources for future exploitation16. The social dimension to sustainable management 
is, on the other hand, closely linked with notions of distributive justice and with 
balancing access to contested resources equitably between competing appropriators. 
The distributive function can be performed through the allocation and qualification of 
property rights giving a right of access to the resource, or through the application of 
legally sanctioned management rules governing resource use. The promotion of 
ecological sustainability, on the other hand, is a policy imperative of more recent 
provenance, focussed to ensuring ‘the use of components of biological diversity in a 
way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, 
thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future 
generations’.17   
 
The distributive and resource preservation functions inherent in promoting the 
sustainable management of common land were both addressed – albeit imperfectly -
by the management principles developed at common law prior to the 1965 Act. In 
upland areas the density and type of grazing livestock permitted on common land was 
a key factor for the economic sustainability of rural communities, and for the 
condition of the vegetation (and by implication wildlife habitats) on the commons. It 
might be possible, for example, to argue that the nascent concept of sustainable 
management was immanent in the principles used by the manor courts to quantify and 
limit the number of stock grazed on upland commons – although recent 
interdisciplinary research indicates that this hypothesis must be heavily qualified18.  
Two mechanisms were used to limit grazing numbers prior to the Commons 
Registration Act 1965: the principle of levancy and couchancy (sometimes referred to 
as grazing sans nombre), which tied the number of permitted livestock to the needs of 
the dominant land to which the rights attached;19 and the practice of ‘stinting’, where 
                                                 
16
 This is essentially what the well known definition of sustainable development given in the 
Brundtland Report is concerned with i.e. “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to met their own needs” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, Our Common Future, pp 8 and 43 (Oxford University Press 1997)). 
17
 Art.2 UN Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, (1992) 31 ILM 818.   
18
 See working papers on the Eskdale, Ingleton, and Elan Valley case studies generated by the AHRC 
Contested Common Land research project and available at http://www.commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies.  
19
 The phrase “sans nombre” was used to describe some pasturage rights when annexed to dominant 
land. The assumption has always been that the phrase was used to describe rights quantified under the 
rule of levancy and couchancy (where the number of animals allowed on the common was numerically 
uncertain), in contrast to those governed by stinting where a certain number was fixed by the right 
itself. See Chichly’s Case [1658] 145 ER 409.It’s customary origins may, however, be more obscure. 
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the number of grazing animals permitted on the common from each dominant 
tenement was numerically fixed.     
 
Levancy and Couchancy 
 
Common pasturage rights were usually attached (appurtenant)20 to the dominant 
tenement which they benefitted.  The right is a profit a prendre, literally expressed as 
the right to take grass by the mouth of cattle, sheep, horses or other livestock, 
depending on the nature of the right21. The common law principle of couchancy and 
levancy dictated that the number of animals permitted summer grazing on a common 
was determined by the ability of the dominant land to which the rights were 
appurtenant (typically a farm adjoining the common) to sustain them from its own 
produce22 over the winter when they were not turned out on the common itself23. This 
principle was most commonly applied to regulate grazing on large and open 
unenclosed pastures in the uplands, such as those in the Lake District, North Pennines 
and central Wales24.  
 
As a mechanism for protecting the agronomic or environmental condition of common 
land, levancy and couchancy had obvious drawbacks. The focus of the principle was 
primarily to establish an equitable method for determining the comparative access to 
the grazing resourcerights of different commoners having rights of pasturage over the 
common, not to preserve the common pasture on the common iitself. By focussing on 
the size and productivity of the dominant land (not the common – the servient land) it 
                                                                                                                                            
For an erudite discussion of the origins and legal status of rights sans nombre prior to the Commons 
Registration Act 1965 see G.D. Gadsden, The Law of Commons (Sweet & Maxwell 1988) at para. 
3.137-3.139. And see A.J.L.Winchester, Harvest of the Hills (Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2000) 
at 79-81 and Figure 4.1.  
20
 Rights can also be “appendant”.  Appendant rights originate in the customary right of someone who 
was granted feudal tenure of arable land to graze his cattle – the animals necessary to plough and 
manure the lord’s arable land – on the wasteland of the manor. See generally Tyrringham’s case [1584] 
4 Co.Rep. 36a (76 ER 973). They are very rarely encountered today. 
21
 Samborne v Harilo [1621] 123 ER 1162 at 163 (Bridgman J.); Earl de law Warr v Miles [1881] LR 
ChD 535 at 577 (Bacon V-C); Besley v John [2003] EWCA Civ 1737 (where it was held inter alia that 
the right does not include a right to supplementarily feed animals on the common). 
22
 Including fodder produced on the dominant holding, such as hay and root crops used for feeding 
livestock. 
23
 See Cole v Foxman [1618] 74 ER 1000 
24
 See A.J.L.Winchester, “Upland Commons in Northern England”, Chapter 2  in (De Moor, Shaw-
Taylor and Warde eds.) The Management of Common Land in North West Europe c.1500-1850, 
(above, note 12) esp. 45-46 and Figure 2.3. 
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encouraged overgrazing of the commons. It also failed to reflect the realities of 
agricultural practice in the uplands: for example, a strict application of the rule would 
prevent the practice of agistment25 or the overwintering of commoners’ stock on 
lowland farms away from the manor, both of which were widespread and recorded 
practices by the sixteenth century26.  
 
The impact of the principle on sustainable commons management can be illustrated 
by evidence from Eskdale common. Documentary evidence of the customary land use 
in the manor survives in the Eskdale Twenty Four Book,27 several copies of which are 
extant.28 Levancy and couchancy is referred to as a guiding principle for regulating 
the pasturage rights on Eskdale common in several passages in the award.29 The 
weaknesses of the principle as a resource management tool are, however, amply 
demonstrated by historical evidence of actual grazing practice on Eskdale common. 
Pasturage rights for 12300 sheep and followers were registered under the Commons 
Registration Act 1965.30 During the nineteenth century livestock grazing was often 
intensive., and at other times less so. A tithe commissioner reported in 1839 that there 
were ‘probably twenty thousand’ sheep in the district and that ‘far more sheep are 
kept... than the lands will keep in condition, and a very great number of lamb hoggs 
are sent to winter on inclosed grounds in distant parts of the country’  - a clear breach 
the rules of levancy and couchancy recorded in the Eskdale Twenty Four Book.. 31. 
                                                 
25
 i.e. the grazing of another person’s stock on the common in return for payment (often referred to as 
“tack”). See G.D. Gadsden, The Law of Commons (Sweet & Maxwell 1988) at paras. 3.109 and  7.12   
26
 See further A.Winchester, Harvest of the Hills (Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2000) at 93-97. 
27
 This records the award of “four and twenty sworn men” chosen by the consent of the steward of the 
manor to ensure “the right Commodity, Profit and benefit of Common and perpetual Order and Stay” 
among the tenants of the manor in 1587. A copy of the text is available on the AHRC Contested 
Common Land website: http://www.commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/eskdale.  
28
 The original 1587 award does not itself survive. The award was confirmed by a codicil sworn by a 
further “jury of xxiiii” in 1701, and the surviving manuscript copies are of a copy made in 1692 to 
which the 1701 award has been appended. 
29
 The terms “levancy” and “couchancy” are not themselves used. The principle is nevertheless referred 
to, for example, in terms that record (i) that “every one [of the tenants is] to have their sheep lying in 
their own cow pasture in Winter time at their own discretion” (ii) “And ...no Tenant  shall take any 
Cattle to Grassing within the said Lordship upon paine of vis viiid every beast so taken but such like as 
the[y] Winter…” (emphasis added) : A copy respecting the Common etc. belonging to the Lordship of 
Eskdaile, Miterdaile and Wasdailehead dated 18th March 1587 respectively at page 9 and a later 
passage headed “Against taking of Cattle or Horses in Summer” (copy obtained courtesy of the Eskdale 
commoners association).. 
30
 Register of Common Land, Register Unit Cumberland CL 58. And see the analysis of the commons 
register available at http://www.commns.ncl.ac.uk/case studies/eskdale 
31
 Public Record Office/R18/716, Tithe File: Netherwasdale, Eskdale and Wasdale, Report on the 
Agreement for the Commutation of Tithes. Visited 11 July 1839 by John Job Rawlinson, Assistant 
Tithe Commissioner (answer to question 11) (emphasis added). The Report covered Wasdalehead and 
 8
The Agricultural Statistics for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century also 
record substantial numbers. There were 12500 sheep and lambs grazing in Eskdale in 
1877, and a further 5740 recorded in Netherwasdale32. In 1897 the figure recorded in 
Eskdale, Miterdale, Wasdale and Netherwasdale was 17443 sheep and followers33, 
and by 1907 it had increased to 1874634.  
 
 The volume of livestock grazing Eskdale common suggests that the principle of 
levancy and couchancy had ceased to be enforced by the mid-nineteenth century35. 
This experience is likely to have been repeated on many open upland commons. 
Indeed, the ineffectiveness of the principle of levancy and couchancy as a tool for 
regulating grazing pressure may itself be largely to blame for the fact that many of the 
upland commons subsequently registered under the Commons Registration Act 1965 
are now burdened with excessive registrations of grazing rights36. 
  
Stinted pastures 
 
Less prevalent was the practice of stinting i.e. determining the number of animals to 
be grazed by reference to a fixed number allowed on the common from each farm 
having common rights of pasturage (expressed as a ‘stint’ or ‘beastgate’). Although 
the stint fixed a number of animals to be grazed, in theory each stint over a sole 
pasture was identical to any other and represented a fixed proportion of the whole of 
the right of pasturage on the common. While the stint had a fixed number of animals 
attached to it, these were variable by agreement between the stint holders and could 
be adjusted to take account of decreases or increases in the amount of grazing 
available. As a mechanism it therefore accommodated not only notions of social 
                                                                                                                                            
Netherwasdale, in addition to Eskdale itself and Miterdale.  Netherwasdale is outside CL 58 (Eskdale 
common). The figures given in the report would therefore require discounting to give a figure for sheep 
grazing on Eskdale common itself - but even allowing for this, the figure grazing what is now CL 58 
(Eskdale common) must have been considerably  in excess of the 12300 rights for sheep and followers 
subsequently registered under the Commons Registration Act 1965.  
32
 Public Record Office, Agricultural Statistics, Parish Summaries MAF 68/520 Cumberland 1877, 
sheet 7. Both parishes encompass parts of Eskdale common. 
33
 Public Record Office, Agricultural Statistics, Parish Summaries MAF 68/1660 Cumberland 1897, 
sheet 1.  
34
 Public Record Office, Agricultural Statistics, Parish Summaries MAF 68/2230 Cumberland 1907, 
sheet 8. 
35
 See Eleanor Straughton, Common Grazing in the Northern English Uplands 1800-1965 (The Edwin 
Mellen Press 2008) at 134-142 for an account of the gradual withdrawal of the Eskdale manor court 
from the regulation of grazing practices. The last order enforcing the rule of couchancy and levancy – 
in this case by prohibiting the out-wintering of sheep - appears to have been made in 1778 (ibid at 138). 
36
 G.D.Gadsden, The Law of Commons, (Sweet & Maxwell 1988) at para 4.22, p.115. 
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sustainability (maintaining an equitable basis for access to the land resource for the 
various stint holders), but was also potentially responsive to ecological conditions that 
affected the common and reduced the amount of available grazing. It was arguably, 
therefore, a more effective practice for implementing sustainable management than 
the rule of couchancy and levancy.  
 
There is evidence that in some parts of upland Northern England stinting was imposed 
as a response to a perceived need to control and reduce grazing pressures on common 
land.37 In the Midlands and Southern England stinting appears to have become 
widespread on lowland commons by the end of the sixteenth century in response to 
increased population pressures on the available grazing land.38 In other areas it was 
closely associated with the forest status of manorial wastes,39 and in some with the 
practice of renting additional grazing for specific numbers of stock on manorial 
wastes. The formal legal mechanism for the imposition of stints varied. In some cases 
it was imposed by Inclosure awards, and in others by the mutual agreement of stint 
holders and the owner of the soil.40  
 
The property rights regime applicable to stinted commons is idiosyncratic. Stinted 
pastures were registrable as common land under the Commons Registration Act 1965, 
but there is a question whether regulated pastures created by Inclosure awards should 
have fallen into the registration system at all, as they are not strictly common rights41. 
Not all stinted and regulated pastures were, however, governed by Inclosure awards. 
Ingleborough in North Yorkshire presents evidence of several commons where 
stinting had become prevalent before the passage of the 1965 Act, but not under 
                                                 
37
 See A.Winchester and E.Straughton , “Stints and Sustainability: managing stock levels on common 
land in England c 1600-2006” (2010) Agricultural History Review (forthcoming) ; A.J.L.Winchester, 
“Upland Commons in Northern England”, Chapter 2  in (De Moor, Shaw-Taylor and Warde eds.) The 
Management of Common Land in North West Europe c.1500-1850  (above, note 12) at p.45. 
Winchester cites the example of an Exchequer decree of 1584 imposing stints to resolve a long running 
dispute over the size of pasture rights at Sadgill in Longsleddale (Westmorland), implicit in which is 
pressure on the grazing resource available to the farming community. 
38
 L.Shaw-Taylor, “The Management of common land in the lowlands of southern England c.1500 to c. 
1850”, Chapter 3 in (De Moor, Shaw-Taylor and Warde eds.) The Management of Common Land in 
North West Europe c.1500-1850  (above, note 12) at p.71. And see passim. WG. Hoskins and LD. 
Stamp, The Common Lands of England and Wales (London 1963) at p 50ff. 
39
 For example the Lancashire forests of Bowland, Wyresdale and Quernmore  in the Central Pennines: 
See A.J.L.Winchester, The Harvest of the Hills (Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2000) at pp.83-84. 
40
 Stints could also be created under the Commons Act 1876, as to which see E.Straughton, Common 
Grazing in the Northern English Uplands 1800-1965 (The Edwin Mellen Press 2008) esp.pp204-217.. 
41
 See Gadsden G.D., The Law of Commons ( Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) at 1.59 and 1.75. 
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Inclosure awards. In the Ingleborough area some stinted pastures appear to have been 
separated from the higher moorland by the seventeenth century and appropriated as 
stinted pastures by groups of farms, leaving the higher moorland as unenclosed waste. 
Ingleborough common itself42 appears to have remained unstinted until twenty or 
thirty years ago, when stints were introduced by the Ministry of Agriculture to reduce 
grazing pressures.43 Another area of former manorial waste in the Ingleborough area - 
Scales Moor44 - was stinted by agreement of the stint holders in 1810. This agreement 
was replaced in 1842 by a formal agreement between the stint holders and the lord of 
the manor, aimed at resolving ‘disputes and differences’ that had arisen under the 
1810 arrangement. The 1842 agreement recorded that the 1000 acre common could 
support 800 sheep and that the number of cattle gates available to graziers should be 
adjusted to 160 in total. Each cattle gate would give a right to graze five black faced 
Scotch sheep or four white faced lowland sheep.45 The 1842 agreement is therefore a 
good example of (i) the sensitivity of stinting as a mechanism both for managing 
grazing pressures in order to preserve the value of the agricultural resource that the 
common grazing represents, and (ii) its use as a mechanism for arranging equitable 
access to that resource.   
 
COMMONS REGISTRATION: THE TRUE ‘TRAGEDY’ OF THE 
COMMONS?    
 
The Commons Registration Act 1965 required the registration of both common land 
and of rights over common land46. There is currently 369,394 hectares of registered 
common land in England, a figure which rises to 399,040 hectares if common land 
that is exempt from registration (such as the New Forest, the Forest of Dean and 
                                                 
42
 Ingleborough common is comprised of two separate blocks of registered common land: CL 134 
(Ingleton common) and CL 208 (Clapham common). This arrangement is derivative from manorial 
boundaries in the early modern period between the manors of Clapham, Newby and Ingleton : see 
“Ingleton Case Study Map 1: Manorial Boundaries and Common Land “ (available at 
http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/resources). 
43
 See A.Winchester and E.Straughton, “Ingleton Commons”, p.2ff. (working paper available at 
http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/resources); 
44Register of Common Land, Register Unit North Yorkshire CL 272. 
45
 see A.Winchester and E.Straughton , “Stints and Sustainability: managing stock levels on common 
land in England c 1600-2006” (2009) Agricultural History Review (forthcoming). 
46
 Section 1(1) Commons Registration Act 1965. 
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Epping Forest) is included47. In the case of common rights, it required the registration 
of rights whether they were exercisable at all times or only during limited periods48 
and defined the rights to be registered very widely to include ‘cattlegates or beastgates 
(by whatever name known) and rights of sole or several pasture or herbage or of sole 
or several pasture’.49 All rights that were not registered during the relevant application 
period50 ceased to be exercisable over common land registered under the Act.51 In the 
case of pasturage rights for animals, the Act stipulated that a definite number of 
grazing animals be stated and that the right should be exercisable in relation to 
animals not exceeding that number.52 The broad impact was to require the registration 
of fixed numbers of common grazing rights irrespective of whether they had existed 
sans nombre under the rule of levancy and couchancy, or had previously been stinted. 
Most rights registered under the 1965 Act were appurtenant to the dominant land that 
they benefitted. Some common rights can subsist ‘in gross’ i.e. as personal rights 
unattached to a dominant tenement.53 Many rights in gross were inaccurately 
registered in the Commons Registers54. 
 
The impact of commons registration on the sustainable management of the commons 
was almost wholly negative. The grazing rights registered against each common bore 
no necessary relation to the ability of the common to support the number of animals 
for which rights were registered, or to the ‘optimum’ level of stocking needed to 
prevent overgrazing.55 The 1965 Act made no provision for the appraisal of 
                                                 
47
 See Trends in Pastoral Commoning in England: a study for Natural England  (March 2008, The 
Pastoral Commoning Partnership with H&H Bowes) at p.26. 
48
 Rights to pasture animals on the common during fixed periods in the summer months (for example 
from Lady Day, 25th March, annually) were therefore registrable. 
49
 Section 22(1) Commons Registration Act 1965. 
50
 Two periods for application for registration were prescribed by reg. 5 of the Commons Registration 
(General) Regulations 1966 (SI 1966/1471), each with a subsequent period for objections to 
provisional registrations. The relevant application periods were (i) January 2 1967 to June 30 1968 
(objections to provisional registrations to be made by September 30 1970) and (ii) July 1 1968 to 
January 2 1970 (objections to provisional registrations to be made by July 31 1972). 
51
 Section 1(2) ibid. 
52
 See section 15 ibid. This provision has implications for ascertaining the maximum sustainable 
grazing on the common, to which we return below: see note104 below. 
53
 In the case of Eskdale, for example, two entries in the Commons Register record rights in gross, 
numbering in total 873 sheep grazing rights: Cumberland  CL 58, Rights Section, Entry nos. 62 and 65.  
54
 See Gadsden at 3.43, 3.44 and Aitchison and Gadsden in (Howarth W and Rodgers CP (Eds.)) 
Agriculture Conservation and Land Use (University of Wales Press,1992) (ibid.)at p.174. 
55See generally Common Land: The Report of the Common Land Forum (Countryside Commission, 
1986). An interesting account of the deficiencies of the registration process in East Anglia is given in 
S.Birtles, “The Impact of Commons Registration: a Norfolk Study” (1998) 20 Landscape History 83-
97.   
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applications for the registration of common rights against sustainability criteria – 
either in terms of the capacity of each common to provide adequate pasture for the 
number of grazing rights claimed, or in terms of the potential environmental impact of 
their exercise on wildlife habitats present on the common.56 The registration of 
common rights should, moreover, have been based on the historic grazing practice on 
each common, but this was rarely checked by commons registration authorities. 
Consequently, grazing numbers were sometimes inflated. In some cases the rights 
registered under the 1965 Act may never have been exercised at all (or only exercised 
in part), or they may have been exercised at certain periods and not others.57  
 
Commons registration severed such links as had previously existed between common 
property rights and principles of ‘sustainable’ management. An ancillary effect of the 
requirement for each grazier to register a fixed maximum number of grazing livestock 
was the removal of any potential for the common law principles of levancy and 
couchancy and stinting to perform a meaningful function in relation to sustainable 
management. Following their registration, common property rights ceased to be 
inherently reflexive, and were rendered incapable of variation to meet changing 
ecological conditions. The courts have subsequently held that the requirement to 
register fixed grazing numbers effectively abolished couchancy and levancy.58 And it 
destroyed the inherent ability of stinting to act as a reflexive mechanism to adjust 
grazing pressures in response to environmental factors.  
 
In cases where a common is burdened with excessive registrations of pasturage rights, 
the property rights reflected in the register will have also ceased to capture the former 
distributive functions of couchancy and levancy, and of stinting, in allocating land use 
rights equitably between competing users. If each commoner has more than sufficient 
                                                 
56This was one of the principal deficiencies of the 1965 Act identified by the Common Land Forum, 
and undoubtedly led to inflated numbers of rights being registered for some commons : Report of the 
Common Land Forum ibid. Appendix Cat paras 015 - 018.  
57
 Gadsden op.cit.at 4.22.An example is provided by the Register of Common Land, Register Unit 
Ceredigion CL 6 (Cwmystwyth), adjoining the Elan Valley. This relatively small common has 
registered grazing rights for 2800 sheep, 45 cattle and 30 ponies, and is divided into several discrete 
blocks of land, each with sole grazing rights. The maximum number of sheep grazed over the common 
in recent years was approximately 1600 in summer, during the currency of the headage payment 
system for Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances, which incentivised increased grazing numbers of 
sheep in the 1990s. The registered total was clearly unsustainable; 
http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/elanvalley/qualitativeresearchdata (Semi structured interview 3rd 
March 2009). 
58
 See Bettison v Langton [2001] 3 All ER 417. 
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registered rights for all foreseeable purposes, and cumulatively with others more than 
the grazing can sustain without serious damage to the common, then the property 
rights reflected in the register will cease to have any meaningful allocative function in 
terms of regulating access to the land resource. The allocative function formerly 
performed through property rights must therefore be exercised by alternative means, 
such as through publicly funded environmental management schemes. This is what 
has, in large measure, subsequently happened on many commons with high nature 
value59.     
 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE MODERN COMMONS 
 
An important focus of modern public policy is on improving the environmental 
management of common land in order to benefit wildlife and habitats. Ecologically 
focussed management presents a dilemma, however: the legal protection of common 
land has always been premised upon rights to use and to take resources from the land, 
as we have seen, and not on preserving any nature conservation value that it may 
possess60. The common law did not capture “ecological” sustainability principles and 
the property rights now reflected in the commons registers are therefore ill suited for 
promoting modern environmental policy. These objectives have instead been pursued 
through environmental legislation that regulates and/or prohibits potentially harmful 
land use practices, and by publicly funded rural development initiatives that promote 
the environmentally beneficial management of wildlife habitats and landscapes.  
 
The Commons as Environmental Resource 
 
The principal legal mechanism for nature conservation is the designation of 
geographically distinct high nature valueprotected areas for protection, the primary 
                                                 
59
 The register for Ceredigion CL 6 (Cwmystwyth) (above footnote 57)  is an example. The rights 
registered on CL 6 far exceed those capable of exercise, or actually exercised, by successive graziers. 
The only mechanism for controlling access to the resource, in this case, would therefore be through 
limits on grazing numbers fixed in a management agreement under an agri-environment scheme such 
as Tir Gofal, which is designed to encourage heather regeneration and sustainable grazing in upland 
areas of Wales. Or controls on overgrazing introduced through the agricultural support measures of the 
common agricultural policy: see the Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support 
Schemes (Cross Compliance)(Wales) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3280,reg.4 and  Schedule para.6.   
60
 See D.McGillivray and J.Holder, “Locality, Environment and Law: the case of town and village 
greens” (2007) 3 International Journal of Law in Context 1-17, at 12. 
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wildlife designations in England and Wales being Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSIs),61 with Special Protection Areas (SPAs) and Special Areas of Conservation 
(SACs) forming part of the European Natura 2000 programme.62  A large proportion 
of the registered common land in England and Wales is designated for protection 
under the relevant European or national environmental legislation. In England 
210,806 hectares, approximately 57% of the total area of common land, is in SSSIs 
notified under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.63 
 
The poor condition of many natural habitats found on common land is a major 
problem for the implementation of public policy. In 2003, 67% of the common land in 
SSSIs, by area, was assessed by Natural England as being in unfavourable 
condition.64 Contemporary research shows that in 2008 only 19% was in favourable 
conservation condition; 48% was in unfavourable but recovering condition; 27% in 
unfavourable condition with no change and 6% in an unfavourable declining 
position.65 The poor environmental condition of common land continues to be 
problematic relative to improvements seen elsewhere in the national suite of protected 
wildlife sites. The habitats found in 80% of the total area of the national SSSI network 
had, for example, improved to “favourable” conservation status by 200866.  The 
government has set itself a Public Service Agreement target to have 95 % of SSSIs in 
favourable conservation condition by the end of 2010. Clearly, improving the 
environmental management of protected habitats on common land is a key priority if 
this is to be achieved.  
                                                 
61
 Notified under Part 2 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended by Sched. 9 Countryside and 
Rights of Way Act 2000. Notification is by the “Conservation Body” i.e. Natural England or the 
Countryside Council for Wales: Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, section 32. 
62
 Special Protection Areas are designated under Council Directive 79/404/EEC on the conservation of 
wild birds [1979] OJ L103/1. Special Areas of Conservation are designated under Council Directive 
92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora and fauna, [1992] OJ L206/7. Both 
designations are transposed in English Law by the Conservation (Natural Habitats & C.) Regulations 
1994 SI 1994/2176 as amended by SI 20071843, SI 2008/2172, and SI 2009/6. All European Sites are, 
as a matter of policy, also designated as SSSIs under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. 
63
 See Trends in Pastoral Commoning in England: a study for Natural England  (March 2008, The 
Pastoral Commoning Partnership with H&H Bowes), Tables 3.1, 3.2 
64
 Agricultural Use and Management of Common Land: Report of the Stakeholder Working Group, 
(DEFRA 2003) Appendix A. For the criteria used by the conservation bodies when undertaking 
condition assessments of SSSIs, SACs and SPAs see guidance from the Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee:  JNCC Guidance on Common Standards Monitoring available at 
http://www.jncc.gov.uk/page-2272. 
65
 Natural England, The State of the Natural Environment 2008 (Natural England research report 
NE85),  para 3.2.4.2 and Figure 3.1.  
66
 Ibid. para 3.2.4.2 
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Common land is also an important component in environmental policy for landscape 
protection. In England 48% of common land is in National Parks and 30% is in Areas 
of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The overall importance of common land to the 
national mosaic of designated wildlife and landscape areas is clear: 88% of the 
common land in England is to be found within one or more of the principal sites 
designated either for landscape or habitat protection.67 These designations often 
intersect and overlap. There are, for example, four SSSIs within the boundaries of 
Eskdale common,68 the whole common is within the Lake District National Park, and 
much of it is also within the Lake District High Fells SAC.  
 
Property Rights – The Implications for Habitat Protection 
 
The property rights regime for common land, captured in the registers established 
under the Commons Registration Act 1965, is inadequately integrated with the policy 
objectives represented in modern environmental legislation. As we have seen, the 
1965 Act failed to subject prospective registrations of common rights to a 
sustainability appraisal - either of their potential impact on the preservation of the 
common grazing resource or of their impact on the ecology of the common. The 
legislation for the notification and protection of SSSIs, SPAs and SACs, similarly, 
takes no account of the fact that protected sites may include common land. Where a 
SSSI includes common land, the dislocation between property rights and the 
environmental legislation causes problems both in applying the initial procedures for 
notifying the site, and in subsequently securing an agreement or management scheme 
to promote the conservation and improvement of its natural features.69 
 
The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 requires the conservation body to notify an 
SSSI to ‘every owner and occupier’ of land within the site.70 The inaccuracy of the 
Commons Registers established under the 1965 Act makes the process of notifying 
sites that include common land problematic. Identifying the owners of common rights 
                                                 
67
 see Trends in Pastoral Commoning in England (2008) above n.63 at Table 3.2. 
68
 Beckfoot Quarry SSSI, Nab Gill Mine SSSI, Scafell Pikes SSSI, and the Wasdale Screes SSSI.  
69
 See C.P.Rodgers, "Environmental Management of Common Land: Towards a New Legal 
Framework?” (1999) 11 JEL 231 
70
 Section 28(1)(b) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, amended by Countryside and Rights of Way 
Act 2000 Sched. 9. 
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may be difficult, especially where a holding with appurtenant common rights has been 
transferred or divided and sold, or where the rights are not currently being exercised. 
The 1965 Act did not impose a duty to notify changes in the ownership or tenure of 
either the dominant tenement or of the rights themselves71. The requirement for the 
conservation bodies to notify every occupier when notifying an SSSI is often 
impracticable, especially where a large number of commoners hold rights that they do 
not exercise. In Eskdale, for example, English Nature served the Scafell Pikes SSSI 
notification on 30 commoners with registered rights in 1988 – notwithstanding that 
there were only 10 active graziers on the common72. They encountered considerable 
difficulties caused by the need to identify all commoners and owners, by inadequate 
rights of access to identify conservation features, and by the need to notify everyone 
with a registered interest in the common.73 
  
Accurately identifying those currently exercising common rights is often further 
complicated by the practice of leasing or licensing common grazing rights for the use 
of others,74 and by the exercise of rights enjoyed by virtue of a landlord/tenant 
relationship with the owner of the soil.75 On commons where grazing was formerly 
controlled by stinting the transfer of rights is frequently encountered. Fixing livestock 
grazing numbers through the practice of stinting produced a different perception of 
grazing rights - as commodified elements of resource utility and freely transferable 
rights in land76. These problems may be compounded where an SSSI includes land 
over which common rights exist ‘in gross’, as they can legitimately be transferred 
independently of the dominant land for the benefit of which they are exercised.  The 
owner of the soil must also be notified, and where there is no known owner Natural 
England must notify the local planning authority in whose area the land is situated - a 
                                                 
71See section 13 Commons Registration Act 1965, and the Commons Registration (General) 
Regulations 1966, SI 1966/1471. 
72
 See http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/eskdale/qualitativeresearchdata. The assistance of Natural 
England in providing access to notification data is gratefully acknowledged. 
73
 http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/eskdale/qualitativeresearchdata  (semi structured interview, 
13th December 2007). 
74
 This practice was widespread, although of questionable legality: see Gadsden,GD op.cit. at 6.23 – 
6.30. It is now impermissible by virtue of section 9 Commons Act 2006, except for short terms of  2 
years  (in England) and 3 years (in Wales): see the Common (Severance of Rights) (England) Order 
2006 SI 2006/2145,  and the Commons (Severance of Rights) (Wales) Order 2007 SI 2007/583 (W55).  
75
 See Gadsden GD op.cit.at 4.10, 4.11, and Aitchison, J and Gadsden, GD op.cit. in (Howarth W and 
Rodgers CP (Eds.)) Agriculture Conservation and Land Use (University of Wales Press,1992) at p.174. 
76
 See http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/Ingleton/qualitativeresearchdata  on perceptions of 
property in stints, in this case on commons in the Ingleborough area of North Yorkshire.  
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process that can be difficult if a common straddles the boundaries of several local 
authority areas and ownership of the soil is fragmented and uncertain77.  
 
The Commons Act 2006 makes provision for the amendment and correction of the 
registers established under the 1965 Act, but is unlikely to resolve all of these 
problems. It requires the commons registration authorities to maintain the registers 
established under the 1965 Act,78 which will be rolled over and become registers 
under the 2006 Act. It does not, however, reopen the registration of either common 
land or common rights - save for making provision for the correction of incorrect 
entries or omissions from the register of common land, and for the registration of new 
common land and new rights of common created after it comes into force79. Any 
changes to registered rights that have occurred since 2nd January 1970 must be 
registered in the updated register during the transitional period for revising the 
registers in each registration area. In the case of the ‘pilot’ registration areas this will 
have to be done by 30th September 201080.   This will apply to any variation or 
surrender of a right of common that has occurred since 1970, to any transfer of a right 
held in gross, or any severance or apportionment of a right attached to land that has 
occurred since initial registration.81  
 
Any right of common to which these provisions apply, but which has not been 
registered by the end of the transitional period, will be extinguished.82 An amendment 
of the commons register is not required, however, where rights of common are 
attached to land that has been sold or transferred (without severance of the rights) 
between 2nd January 1970 and the end of the transitional period.83 The 2006 Act also 
prevents the severance of appurtenant rights from the dominant land, thereby 
                                                 
77
 Natural England, pers. comm. 13th December 2007. These difficulties have now been eased by 
section 57 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, which preserves the efficacy of  an 
SSSI notification where an owner or occupier cannot be found and served with relevant notices, 
provided Natural England have taken “all reasonable steps” to ensure notice has been served on every 
owner or occupier of land to which the notice relates (section 70B Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, 
inserted by section 57 of the 2006 Act)..  
78
 Commons Act 2006, ss1,2. They are to be updated under Part 1 of the 2006 Act. 
79
 Ibid s.3(1), 3(3). There are provisions in Schedule 2 for the amendment of the registers to amend 
incorrect registrations of common land. 
80
 Commons Registration (England) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1961, reg. 39 (2). For the seven pilot 
areas see footnote 2 above. 
81
 Commons Act 2006 Schedule 3 para 2 ((3) (definition of "relevant disposition") 
82
 Ibid. Schedule 3 para 3 
83
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precluding the creation of new rights in gross and securing the attachment of 
appurtenant common rights pro rata to the land they are intended to benefit.84 Rights 
in gross created prior to the introduction of the 2006 Act are unaffected, but the 
transfer of such rights will in future only be legally effective when entered in the 
registers established by the 2006 Act. In principle these changes will make it easier to 
identify the owner of common rights, but substantial difficulties will remain if title to 
the dominant land to which they are attached is not itself registered at HM Land 
Registry  
 
Environmental Management Objectives 
 
To what extent can the protection of ecosystems, habitats and species be balanced 
against the impacts of common resource use, and how? Theories of ‘weak’ 
sustainability attribute limited weight to protecting natural capital when balancing the 
needs of development and environmental protection.85 This approach underpins most 
land management instruments applied to promote nature conservation in modern 
English law,86 and involves a balancing function in which the needs of the 
environment are often traded off against economic development87. The principal 
ecological management objectives for Natura 2000 sites are set out in the EC Habitats 
Directive of 199288 i.e. to maintain and, where appropriate, restore the ‘favourable 
conservation status’ of natural habitats and species for the protection of which Special 
                                                 
84
 Ibid. section 9; Commons (Severance of Rights) (England) Order 2006 SI 2006/2145. Section 9 
reverses the effect of the House of Lords ruling in Bettison v Langton [2001] 3 All ER 417. 
85
 See D.Pearce, Blueprint 3 – Measuring Sustainable Development (Earthscan 1993) at 13-16 
86
 For example the statutory consultation mechanisms for potentially damaging operations in SSSIs 
used under section 28 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended; and in the development control 
principles applied in protected areas through planning law (see PPS 9  “Biodiversity and Geological 
Conservation”, ODPM 2005). The balance is more tightly drawn against development in “European 
sites” designated by the Conservation (Natural Habitats & C) Regulations 1994.  
87
 K.Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability – Transforming Law and Governance (Ashgate,2008) 
at 52. “Strong” sustainability, on the other hand, attributes much greater weight to the protection of the 
natural environment when balancing the needs of development and environmental protection, including 
in some cases an argument that natural capital must be regarded as inviolable: see D.Pearce (above note 
85),  Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (Routledge, 2000)  at 62ff.. 
88
 Directive 92/43/EC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, [1992] OJ 
L 206/7. Article 6.1 requires the member states to adopt “necessary conservation measures” such as 
management plans in SACs (article 4 of the Wild Birds Directive contains similar obligations for 
SPAs); article 6.2 requires them to take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of the sites and 
significant disturbance of the species for which the site has been designated (this applies to both SPAs 
and SACs). 
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Areas of Conservation and Special Protection Areas are designated.89 This concept 
also underpins the objectives for the management of SSSIs notified under the Wildlife 
and Countryside Act 198190. The methodology underpinning the implementation of 
management plans for protected sites is based upon the scientific monitoring and 
appraisal of vegetation and wildlife, and of land use impacts. The formulation of these 
objectives will take no account of the land tenure to which the land in question is 
subject. This can be problematic where protected sites include large areas of common 
land, as the management required to achieve favourable conservation status may be 
incompatible with the framework of property rights reflected in the commons 
registers. The difficulties to which this can give rise are clearly illustrated by the 
experience in the three upland case studies - Cwmdeuddwr common (Powys), Eskdale 
common (Cumbria) and Ingleborough and Scales Moor (North Yorkshire). The case 
studies also demonstrate how the Commons Act 2006 can contribute to their 
successful resolution, and its potential limitations.  ADD SOMETHING HERE 
 
Cwmdeuddwr common is partly within the Elenydd SAC and Elenydd-
Mallaen SPA, a large upland area91 that contains seven natural habitats of European-
level importance92 and three bird species (red kites, peregrines and merlin) requiring 
protection under the EC Wild Birds Directive93. A large part of the common is also 
within the Elenydd SSSI. Two of its most important habitat features are the presence 
of extensive blanket bogs and large areas of European dry heath land. The 
conservation status of the blanket bog in the Elenydd SAC and SSSI was assessed as 
                                                 
89
 Article 1 (e) of the Habitats Directive defines the conservation status of a natural habitat as “the sum 
of influences acting on it and its typical species that may affect its long-term natural distribution, 
structure and functions as well as the long term survival of its typical species”. The conservation status 
of the habitat will be “favourable” when “its natural range and areas it covers within that range are 
stable or increasing; the specific structure and functions which are necessary for its long term 
maintenance exist and are likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future and the conservation 
status of its typical species is favourable”. Article 1 (e) further defines the favourable conservation 
status of protected species by reference to population dynamics data indicating that the species is 
maintaining itself on a long term basis as a viable component of natural habitats, with a natural range 
that is stable upland and where there is a sufficiently large habitat to maintain its populations on a long 
term basis.    
90
 See the guidance from the Joint Nature Conservation Committee applied to monitoring the condition 
of SSSIs, SPAs and SACs: JNCC Guidance on Common Standards Monitoring available at 
http://www.jncc.gov.uk/page-2272  
91
 The Elenydd-Mallaen SPA was designated in 1986 and extends to 30022.14 hectares. The Elenydd 
SAC was designated in 2004 and covers 8609.42 hectares. 
92
 i.e. habitats listed in Annex 1 of Directive 92/43/EC on Habitats and Species . 
93
 i.e. under article 4.1 and Annex 1 of Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds, [1979] 
OJ L103/1 
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unfavourable by the Countryside Council for Wales in 2006, with unauthorised 
burning and heavy grazing by sheep leading to excessive peat losses and damage to 
dwarf shrub populations94. Similarly, the unfavourable condition of the heath land 
habitat on the Elenydd SSSI was attributed to heavy grazing pressure, leading to 
losses of dwarf shrub populations and their replacement by grassy sward95. Purple 
moor grass, molinia caerula, has become dominant in large areas of the site due to the 
effects of intensive sheep grazing over a long period.  
 
The Countryside Council for Wales’ management objectives for habitat restoration 
require that grazing in winter and autumn, particularly by sheep, be avoided, and that 
cattle be reintroduced under a mixed grazing regime to reduce molinia encroachment, 
encourage dwarf shrub regeneration and promote heather96. The common is within the 
Cambrian Mountains Environmentally Sensitive Area (“ESA”)97.  A collective ESA 
management agreement was concluded with the Cwmdeuddwr commoners 
association in 2001, under which the graziers are paid to implement environmentally 
beneficial land management. This requires them to restrict grazing to an average 
annual stocking rate of 0.375 livestock units per hectare98 on unenclosed semi natural 
rough grazing and 0.22 lu/ha in areas of unenclosed semi natural grazing where 
heather is present99. Individual arrangements were concluded with each grazier by 
which they restricted their livestock to a fixed number reflected in sheep “grazing 
days” per annum. This flexible arrangement permitted some to reduce their stocking 
level to an agreed number throughout the year, while others remove their stock 
completely for certain ‘closed’ days to meet their grazing day target – the overall 
                                                 
94
 Countryside Council for Wales, Core Management Plan (including conservation objectives) 
incorporating: Elenydd-Mallaen SPA, Elenydd SAC, Elan Valley Woodlands SAC, Cwm Doethie – 
Mynydd-Mallaen SAC (17th April 2008). See Para 5.1 “Conservation Status and Management 
Requirements for Feature 1 : 7130 Blanket Bogs”. 
95
 Ibid Para 5.2 “Conservation Status and Management Requirements for Feature 2 : 4030 European 
Dry heaths” 
96
 Ibid. Para 5.1 (Management Requirements of Feature 1) and Para 5.2 (Management Requirements of 
Feature 2) 
97
 Designated by the Environmentally Sensitive Area (Cambrian Mountains – Extension) Designation 
Order 1987, SI 1987/2026 (made under Agriculture Act 1986 section 18). 
98
 A "livestock unit" is calculated by reference to the following formula for these purposes: bulls, cows 
and other bovine animals over 2 years old constitute 1 livestock unit each; bovine animals over 6 
months but less than 2 years old are 0.6 livestock units; and sheep and goats constitute 0.15 of a 
livestock unit each (Environmentally Sensitive Area (Cambrian Mountains – Extension) Designation 
Order 1987, SI 1987/2026, Schedule) . 
99
 These are Tier 1A obligations in the Cambrian Mountains ESA. The assistance of the Cwmdeuddwr 
Commoners Association in providing a copy of the ESA agreement for Cwmdeuddwr common, made 
on  20 June 2001, is gratefully acknowledged. 
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impact being to reduce grazing pressures to the ‘global’ density reflected in the ESA 
agreement.  The agreement also prevents increases in livestock grazing, ploughing, 
reseeding and the supplementary feeding of livestock without the permission of the 
Welsh Assembly Government.100    
 
Eskdale common presents similar problems of ecological management and habitat 
regeneration. The Scafell Pike SSSI hosts montane heaths, and the summit boulder 
field hosts rare assemblages of lichen heath.  The Wasdale Screes SSSI runs along the 
southern shore of Wast Water and forms a classic geomorphological example of one 
of the best screes in Britain, with cliffs in the higher areas and unstable screes below. 
The gullies sustain a number of nationally rare plant species, heather and bilberry 
heath. Both SSSIs are highly sensitive to sheep grazing pressures, and both are in 
unfavourable (but recovering) conservation condition.101  
 
An important conservation objective for Eskdale is the introduction of a mixed 
grazing regime with cattle to reduce bracken encroachment and re-establish heather, 
accompanied by a reduction in sheep grazing pressures and the removal of 
overwintering livestock.102 The common was entered into a Tier 1 (Heather fell) ESA 
management agreement negotiated by the Eskdale commoners association in 1995.103 
This resulted in a reduction of summer grazing by sheep to 5139, and to 3852 in 
winter. Further reductions in sheep grazing were introduced in 2003 under Sheep and 
Wildlife Enhancement Scheme (“SWES”) agreements with the 10 active commoners. 
                                                 
100
 The ESA agreement also illustrates the poor integration between the common property rights regime 
and environmental legislation. The terms of the ESA agreement conflict with the property rights in the 
common, in as much as the common right of pasturage is a profit a prendre and gives no right to 
plough, reseed or supplementarily feed livestock on the common. Carrying out any of these operations 
would, in any event, also contravene the list of operations likely to damage the conservation interest 
(“OLDs”) for the Elenydd SSSI and constitute a criminal offence unless consented by the Countryside 
Council for Wales under section 28E(3) Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. 
101
 See Natural England’s SSSI condition summaries at www.naturalengland.org.uk/special/sssi/report 
(compiled February 2009).  The sites’ “recovering” status is attributable to the existence of the ESA 
and SWES management agreements that will in time bring the sites back into favourable conservation 
status, if the management specified in the site management statements for each SSSI are adhered to.    
102
 These sites are within English Nature’s Sustainable Grazing Initiative in Cumbria, and the ESA and 
SWES agreements on Eskdale common described here are integral to the overall approach set out 
therein. For the methodology and application of the Sustainable Grazing Initiative see further: English 
Nature’s Sustainable Grazing Initiative in Cumbria – a review of the success of grazing agreements for 
upland SSSIs, by Webb, Johnston, Hunt, Stainer and Milnes (English Nature, 2006). 
103
 The Lake District ESA was originally designated in 1993 under Agriculture Act 1986, section 18. It 
is currently one of a number of Stage 3 ESAs designated by the Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
(Stage III) Designation Order 2000, SI 2000/3051. 
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These provided a further 40% reduction in sheep grazing numbers on the two SSSIs.  
The annual average grazing density sought for the common under the SWES is 0.8 
ewes per hectare. The further adaptation of land management on Eskdale common - 
including the introduction of mixed grazing with cattle and sheep – will, however, be 
complicated by the nature of the registered common rights and the large number of 
inactive commoners.  
 
IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT  
 
The implementation of environmental management objectives for common land is 
complicated by the poor integration between common property rights and modern 
environmental legislation. A key problem is the relationship between the 
quantification of grazing rights reflected in the Commons Registers, and the levels of 
grazing and other land uses required to implement environmental management 
objectives. The property rights regime can also restrict the types of land management 
that can be introduced, whether sustainable or otherwise. 
 
Quantification of Grazing Rights: Existing Registrations 
 
Given the potential mismatch between registered grazing rights and the carrying 
capacity of the common land over which they are exercisable, the legal status of the 
registered number of rights assumes considerable importance. If X has registered 
rights on Blackacre Common to graze 1000 sheep and followers, does he have a legal 
entitlement to graze 1000 sheep even if this causes damage to the common or its 
environmental features? And what if he is grazing less than 1000 sheep – say 300 – 
but this level of grazing still has detrimental effects? Are X’s property rights as a 
grazier definitively reflected in the number of grazing rights registered under the 1965 
Act? Or are they potentially qualified by reference to sustainability criteria? And if so, 
what criteria would be applied at common law? 
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For existing registrations,104 this turns on the interpretation of section 15 of the 
Commons Registration Act 1965. This provided that ‘where a right consists of or 
includes a right, not limited by number, to graze animals of any class, it shall….be 
treated as exercisable in relation to no more animals…than a definite number’.105 
Once the registration became final, the right became exercisable ‘in relation to 
animals not exceeding the number registered,106 and registration furnished conclusive 
proof of the matters registered.107 The property rights implications of this provision 
were considered in Re The Black Mountain, Dinefwr, Dyfed.108 The commons 
commissioner’s view was that the registered number merely provided an upper limit 
on the number of grazing stock permissible. It followed that legal redress could be 
sought if, at any time, the number of animals grazing the common was considered to 
be excessive, and even if a grazier alleged to be causing damage was grazing fewer 
livestock than his full registered entitlement.  
 
This decision (if followed) could potentially reopen the question of linking 
permissible grazing numbers109 to principles of sustainable land management. 
Whether this would assist with issues of ecological management must, however, be 
questionable. If the principle were accepted, the better view suggests that reference be 
made to the common law principle of levancy and couchancy in order to fix the 
maximum grazing limit for a common.110 But, as we have already seen, the levancy 
and couchancy rule is largely to blame for the excessive registrations reflected in the 
commons registers established under the 1965 Act. It may capture notions of 
economic sustainability, but takes no explicit account of ecological factors – for 
example the management required to achieve favourable conservation status on SSSI 
land. The Common Land Forum recommended in 1986 that the rectification of the 
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 I.e. those made under the Commons Registration Act 1965, prior to the coming into force of Part 1 
Commons Act 2006. 
105
 Section 15(1) Commons Registration Act 1965 (emphasis added). 
106
 Section 15(3) ibid. (emphasis added) 
107
  I.e. once the registration had become final: section 10 ibid. 
108
 [1985] 272/D/441, 16 D.C.C. 219 (Commissioner Baden Fuller). This is the only case in which the 
question has been judicially considered. 
109
 And possibly other land uses, such as turbary (peat extraction) and estovers (gathering bracken for 
animal bedding, or wood for fencing etc.). 
110
 This is the view put forward by Gadsden, op.cit. at para 4.23, p.115. If this is correct it would mean 
that the 1965 Act did not, in fact, abolish couchancy and levancy – contrary to the assumption to this 
effect by the House of Lords in Bettison v Langton [2001] 3 All.ER 417. It is also difficult to see how a 
quantification different to that stated in the register could be arrived at in the case of a stinted pasture, 
where rights will have been fixed numerically ab initio.  
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commons registers should be allowed, where it was necessary to reflect the carrying 
capacity of a common land unit, and that agricultural land tribunals should undertake 
the task of quantifying rights reflected in appropriate carrying capacity.111 This 
suggestion was not taken up in the Commons Act 2006,112 and there remains no 
mechanism for re-evaluating the link between pre-existing registered rights and the 
ecological management of common land.  
 
Creating New Common Rights: the Commons Act 2006 
 
The Commons Act 2006 provides for the amendment and updating of the registers, 
and in some circumstances for the creation of new rights of common by express grant 
or under statute.113 The registration and amendment of new rights will be subject to a 
sustainability appraisal. The Act provides that an application to register the creation of 
a right of common pasturage must be refused ‘if in the opinion of the commons 
registration authority the land over which it is created would be unable to sustain the 
exercise of the right and …any other rights of common exercisable over the land.’ 114 
The same principle will apply to an application to vary115  common rights after Part 1 
of the 2006 Act comes into force.116 An application to register a variation of a grazing 
right must be refused if the land over which it is to subsist would be unable to sustain 
the exercise of the right.117 In both cases the application of sustainability principles is 
linked to the cumulative impact of the new rights on the ability of the common to 
support the continued exercise of the total number of registered grazing rights. This 
might indicate that an economic sustainability model was intended, focussing on the 
preservation of vegetation as a grazing resource. Significantly, however, the commons 
registration authority is required, in every case, to consult Natural England before 
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 Common Land Forum Report, op. cit. Appendix C paras 028 and 114-121. 
112
 The 2006 Act does, however, introduce a link between rights and sustainable land management 
(including quantification of rights) for the registration of new rights registered after Part 1 of that Act 
comes into force. This is discussed below. 
113
 Commons Act 2006 section 6(3). 
114
 Ibid section 6(6) 
115
 Rights can be varied either by becoming attached to new common land, or by virtue of changes 
made to the rights themselves e.g. a change in the number of animals that can be grazed on a common 
land unit. 
116
 Part 1 of the Commons Act 2006 was brought into force in seven “pilot” local authorities on 
October 1st 2008:see note 2 above and the Commons Registration (England) Regulations 2008, SI 
2008/1961. Following review of the pilot, it is expected that Part 1 will be rolled out to other areas of 
England in stages from October 2010 to October 2013. 
117
 ibid section 7(5). 
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approving a new registration or variation of rights.118 This would suggest that impacts 
on the ecology of the common will in practice be an important consideration. 
 
The 2006 Act also provides for the registration of “replacement land” and the release 
in exchange of registered common land. The commons registration authority must 
have regard to the “public interest” when deciding whether to register replacement 
land, and this is expressly defined to include nature conservation, the conservation of 
landscape, the protection of public rights of way and of features of archaeological or 
historic importance119. These reforms will, in time, lead to a strengthening of the link 
between concepts of sustainable management and the property rights reflected in the 
commons registers.  
 
Unused Common Rights 
 
Many commoners fail to exercise their full registered entitlement, and some fail to 
exercise them at all.  It is clearly preferable for the conservation bodies to offer 
management agreements to active commoners, as it is conservation management by 
these graziers that will deliver the objectives of schemes such as ESA and SWES. 
Management payments will, however, only be made to commoners on the basis of 
registered rights. The problem of the ‘inactive grazier’ also impacts upon the 
economic sustainability of farming on common land, as it reduces the farm subsidy 
entitlements of those graziers actively grazing the common – these are calculated by 
reference to the number of rights that each producer holds as a proportion of the total 
number of registered common rights, whether exercised or not.120 
 
The potential for inactive commoners to upset the environmental management of the 
common by subsequently exercising commons rights is considerable, and dictates that 
their interest must also be accommodated if a workable scheme is to be established. 
This arguably results in an inappropriate use of public funds to ‘buy out’ common 
rights that are not (and may never have been) exercised. In Eskdale only 8565 sheep 
were grazing the common immediately prior to the conclusion of the ESA agreement 
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 Reg.36 Commons Registration (England) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1961. 
119
 Ibid section 16(6) and 16(8). 
120
 See DEFRA Policy Update February 2005, in Single Payment Scheme: information for farmers and 
growers (DEFRA, 2005) at p.3 (Common Land).   
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in 1995, according to Natural England,121 and the active graziers were themselves 
only using a proportion of their registered grazing entitlement.122 Securing the 
Eskdale ESA agreement required payments to eleven commoners for 1275 sheep 
grazing rights that remained unused.  Similar problems have arisen elsewhere. Only 
four commons entered the ESA scheme in Wales, of which Cwmdeuddwr common 
was one.123 Negotiating the Cwmdeuddwr ESA agreement took more than two years 
and required visits by representatives of the Cwmdeuddwr commoners association to 
London to negotiate with inactive graziers who had never grazed the common.124 
 
Securing Flexible Management 
 
The commons register may not entitle commoners to implement the type of livestock 
management sought by the conservation bodies. Natural England’s strategic priorities 
in Eskdale, for example, are the encouragement of heather regeneration on the 
common, the restoration of selected areas of woodland and the re-establishment of 
juniper shrub. When the current SWES and ESA agreements expire in 2013, 
continuing sustainable management will depend upon the common being accepted 
into the Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) scheme with a mixed grazing regime for 
both sheep and cattle. Similar strategic objectives have been adopted by the 
Countryside Council for Wales for Cwmdeuddwr common, in order to control molinia 
vegetation, encourage heather regeneration and stabilise peat bog mires. In both cases 
this will conflict with the resource allocation currently reflected in the commons 
registers.   
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 http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/eskdale/qualitativeresearchdata (semi structured interview 
13th December 2007. The register for Register Unit Cumberland CL 58 (Eskdale Common) records 
12300 grazing rights for livestock (see above, note 30). 
122
 It is perhaps noteworthy that at this time the headage payment regime of the common agricultural 
policy encouraged farmers to maximise sheep numbers on the fell. Despite this the numbers of grazing 
stock was clearly substantially lower than that recorded in the nineteenth century – see above notes 32-
34. The commons register for CL 58 also discloses 14 rights of turbary and 5 registered rights of 
estovers - although peat cutting and gathering bracken for animal bedding has not been practiced on the 
common for many years. 
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 See Countryside Council for Wales, Report of the Pori Natur a Threftadaeth (PONT) Conference to 
discuss the implications of the new provisions within part 2 of the Commons Act 2006 to facilitate the 
sustainable grazing management of Wales ‘commons (2007), esp.para 3.5. The other commons to enter 
ESA in Wales were Mynydd mallaen (2088 ha.  with 47 graziers), Ysbyty Ystwyth (310 ha. with 2 
graziers) and Ireland Moor (2785 ha. with 100 graziers). 
124
 http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/elanvalley/qualitativeresearchdata (Semi structured interview, 
3rd March 2009). 
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Historically, cattle were grazed on Eskdale common. Twenty-eight of the registered 
pasturage rights have cattle grazing rights as an alternative to sheep - 14 at a 
conversion rate of 10-ewes/one cow, and a further 14 at a conversion rate of 20-
ewes/one cow. If a prospective entrant to HLS does not have registered rights for 
cattle grazing, or does not have sufficient rights calculated by reference to the 
registered conversion rate for his rights, he will not be able to implement a mixed 
grazing regime. On Cwmdeuddwr common there are no registered rights to graze 
cattle at all.  Nevertheless, prospective entry of the common into the Tir Gofal agri 
environment scheme (or its successors) will probably be dependent upon the 
introduction of a mixed grazing regime.  
 
A possible solution to these problems may involve the use of the ‘surplus’ grazing 
rights possessed by the owner of the soil. The owner is entitled to any surplus grazing 
over and above that held by registered commoners, and this could be licensed to 
graziers to enable them to stock cattle under HLS or Tir Gofal. Many commons do not 
have a surplus of grazing over and above the registered pasturage rights,125however, 
and in any event this device would be dependent on a landowner being willing to 
licence appropriate rights to graziers.126 The power to create new rights of common 
granted by Commons Act 2006 might also be useful.127 But where there is no surplus 
grazing the sustainability appraisal required before the registration of new rights may 
prevent its use, as it requires an appraisal of the cumulative impact of exercising both 
existing registered rights and the new rights sought.128 This is another example of an 
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 The rural payments agency calculate the extent or otherwise of surplus grazing available to the 
owner of a common by reference to a formula based upon a stocking rate of 0.25 LU/ha for SDA 
moorland, 0.75 LU/ha for SDA non-moorland and non-SDA grassland, and 0.25 LU/ha for non-SDA 
heath land. This will be multiplied by the area of the common to arrive at a notional maximum stocking 
figure for the common. Comparison with the number of registered grazing rights registered in the 
commons register for that CL unit will then disclose whether there is any surplus grazing (“headroom”) 
available to the owner, and if so single farm payment entitlements can be claimed accordingly. See  
DEFRA Policy update February 2005, in Single Payment Scheme: information for farmers and 
growers (DEFRA, 2005 update) at p.4 (Owners of Common Land). This is an administrative 
mechanism, and has no common law or legislative foundation under the Commons Registration Act 
1965 or the Commons Act 2006.   
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 Some of whom may not, for example, be his tenants whereas others are. 
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 Section 6(3) Commons Act 2006. 
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 See section 6(6) ibid. The sustainability criteria require the commons registration authority to 
consider the impact of the new rights in addition to “any other rights of common registered as 
exercisable over the land” (section 6(6)(b) ibid.). It must refuse to register a new right if the land 
cannot sustain the exercise of both: this will be the case even if some or all of the currently registered 
rights are not being exercised.  
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undesirable impact of the over registration of rights under the 1965 Act that will live 
on under the 2006 legislation. 
 
Finally, some wildlife habitats require a flexible approach to the management of 
grazing, including the variation of grazing density at different times of the year. 
Where an SSSI contains limestone pavements, for example as at Scales Moor in North 
Yorkshire, their conservation requires low levels of grazing in the winter months 
when vegetation is dormant, and higher levels of grazing in the summer months when 
there are higher levels of vegetation growth.129 It may also be desirable to concentrate 
grazing animals on different parts of the site at different times, depending on the 
habitat’s conservation management requirements. This is difficult to achieve on sites 
that incorporate common land, as the registers reflect a static management model that 
takes no account of the need to vary grazing pressures at different times and on 
different parts of the common. Although the customary rules administered by the 
manorial courts often regulated the movement of animals to and from the commons at 
specific times of the year, the rights registered under the 1965 Act do not reflect these 
nuances and often give numerically fixed grazing rights without qualification by 
reference to when in the annual agricultural calendar the rights are to be exercised.130   
 
These problems reflect the failure of the Commons Registration Act 1965 to take 
account of the sustainable management of the commons when enshrining fixed 
numbers and types of grazing as property rights in the commons registers. The 
register reflects a static system of property rights in the commons that captures claims 
to land use made on registration in the late 1960s, many of which obscured historic 
land uses, and did not reflect the contemporary needs and use of the common’s 
natural resources.  
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 This is also a problem on Ingleborough common in North Yorkshire, for example: see  
http://commons.ncl.ac.uk/casestudies/ingleton/qualitativeresearchdata 
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 But not always. In the case of  Ingleborough common and Scales moor (North Yorkshire), some  
registered rights provide for a “closed period” between 5th November and 9th December annually, when 
no grazing is permitted. This probably reflects historic practice on the common but is not consistently 
recorded in the registers however, with some rights entries failing to record the close period while 
others do so: see for example Register Unit North Yorkshire CL 134, rights section entries 3,5-13, 27-
29 (closed periods recorded), as compared to entries 18-22 and  31-41 (no closed period for grazing).  
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SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF COMMONS COUNCILS 
 
For sustainable management to be effective, it requires a flexible approach in which 
property rights can be adapted to meet the needs of conservation management.  Part 2 
of the Commons Act 2006 could facilitate a move towards a more dynamic model of 
property rights in the commons. It will enable commoners and other stakeholders to 
establish statutory commons councils, and this will facilitate collaborative self 
regulation and management that could rectify many of the problems caused by the 
1965 legislation.131  
 
The promotion of sustainable management is central to the role of commons councils, 
and is closely focussed to both economic and ecological sustainability criteria. 
Commons councils will be corporate bodies132 with power to enter into legal 
agreements and to initiate legal action in their own name.133 When exercising their 
statutory functions, they must have regard to the public interest, including nature 
conservation and the conservation of landscape.134 The powers conferred on commons 
councils are extensive, but not unlimited. The 2006 Act provides that a commons 
council can make binding regulations to regulate agricultural activities, the 
management of vegetation and the exercise of common rights on the common.135 The 
rule making power can also be used to make rules governing the leasing or licensing 
of grazing rights.136 A commons council will also have power to remove animals 
illegally grazing the common and to remove unlawful boundaries and other 
encroachments.137 Regulations made using these powers will be subject to 
confirmation by the Secretary of State.138 There is also provision for commons 
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 DEFRA sponsored three pilot “shadow” commons council projects in 2008 to assess the feasibility 
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councils to establish ‘living’ registers of the ownership and usage of common 
rights.139 Such a register A "live" register would give an accurate picture of the 
entitlements affecting the common, the current holders of entitlements, and the 
manner in which they are being exercised (e.g. the number of animals stocked on the 
common by each commoner). This would require compulsory registration to the 
commons council of all formal and informal transfers of grazing entitlements, and the 
supply of information as to stocking numbers by adjoining landowners turning stock 
out onto the common.  
 
The introduction of binding rules governing grazing on the common will have a 
number of benefits. Principally, it will facilitate the conclusion of agri-environmental 
agreements over a common by enabling the commons council to enter into 
agreements in its own right, and by enabling it to guarantee performance of land 
management obligations using its powers to regulate the agricultural management of 
the common. It would, for example, be possible to introduce management rules 
binding inactive graziers and preventing them from exercising previously unused 
common rights.140 This will facilitate sustainable management by removing the 
necessity to accommodate the property rights represented by registered (but unused) 
rights in environmental management agreements on common land.141 The 
introduction by commons councils of agricultural management rules of this kind 
would result in some commoners having registered rights that they are not legally 
entitled to exercise. The rights will be ‘sterilised’ for the period of the restriction, 
although the rights themselves – being registered on the commons register – will still 
subsist at law.  
 
Finally, the power to create new common rights following the implementation of Part 
1 of the 2006 Act142 offers a management tool that can avoid some of the problems 
arising from the mismatch between registered commons rights and the type of 
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 6(3) Commons Act 2006 
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sustainable management sought by the conservation bodies for common land. Where 
mixed grazing regimes with cattle and sheep are sought, for example, it will be 
possible to create new common rights to graze cattle in appropriate numbers. It will 
also be advantageous where a common is currently under-grazed, or is wholly unused 
with no management (sustainable or otherwise) being applied. Moreover, new 
common rights can be vested in a commons council itself. The creation of additional 
rights vested in a statutory commons council will enable the council to deliver a 
flexible form of environmental management and to conclude agri-environmental 
agreements in ways that the current registration system makes difficult or impossible.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The true ‘tragedy’ of the commons in an English context was the application of a 
flawed registration system for common rights by the Commons Registration Act 
1965. The deleterious impacts of the 1965 Act were many and far reaching. It not 
only created a deficient and incomplete system of rights registration; it also severed 
the link between property rights in the commons and long-established management 
principles that could deliver their sustainable management. The property rights 
reflected in the commons registers complicate the environmental management of 
common land, distort the management choices available to commoners and the 
conservation agencies, and adversely impact upon the economic viability of farming 
in marginal upland areas by reducing commoners’ farm support entitlements. As well 
as destroying the inherently flexible common law principles of couchancy and 
levancy and stinting, the 1965 Act created an inflexible system of property rights that 
continues to hamper and complicate the introduction of sustainable management of 
the modern commons. The failure to subject registrations to a sustainability appraisal, 
and the registration of excessive numbers of grazing rights on many commons, also 
destroyed the former function of property rights as an allocative tool of resource 
distribution, and will continue to impact upon sustainability appraisals for the 
registration of new common rights created under Part 1 of the Commons Act 2006. It 
also destroyed the ability of property rights to deliver economic sustainability on 
commons subject to the over registration of rights.  
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Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ was not explicitly concerned with the 
‘sustainability’ of common resource use. Neither has this been the central focus of 
Ostrom’s work or that of other scholars of collective institutional action. Implicit in 
Hardin’s analysis, however is the notion that individual property rights are essential to 
provide an incentive for the stewardship of common pool resources. Viewed in 
historical context, the legal regime for managing common land provides very little 
evidence for Hardin’s thesis. The practice of stinting common pastures may, perhaps, 
support Hardin’s argument. Stints were regarded as a separate species of property by 
their owners, and prior to the Commons Registration Act 1965 the commodification 
of rights in this form arguably encouraged better collaborative management of the 
common resource than the rule of levancy and couchancy. The role of levancy and 
couchancy in relation to the ‘tragedy’ thesis is less clear. The principle required the 
attachment of rights to land – but to a dominant tenement outside the common which 
it was intended to benefit, not to the common land itself. While it was arguably 
responsible for over exploitation, commons formerly governed by levancy and 
couchancy do not fit Hardin’s stereotype of a ‘common’ pool resource entirely 
divorced from property ownership structures.  Historically, the failure to control over-
exploitation in many cases was more likely to have been caused by a failure of 
collective management through the local manor courts.   
 
The history of the ‘sustainable’ management of common land shows a clear 
development from a position where the economic and social components of 
sustainable development were addressed through property rights, albeit imperfectly in 
some cases, to a position where ecological sustainability is today the dominant public 
policy paradigm.143 Exponents of ecological sustainability have argued that it is the 
only component of sustainable development that has the ability to meet the criteria of 
a legal principle, and is essential to underpin both sustainable economic and social 
development.144 Others have argued that the best way to protect other fundamental 
legal principles (such as the polluter pays and precautionary principles) is to operate 
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 Bosselmann op cit at 53. 
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within a system based upon ecological sustainability that seeks to preserve the earth’s 
natural resources.145  
 
The contemporary development of new principles for the sustainable management of 
common land reflect and illustrate this change of emphasis, and arguably provide a 
case study of the emergence of ecological sustainability as the dominant paradigm for 
‘sustainable’ land management. The resource distribution and preservation functions 
formerly performed by common property rights have been superseded by land 
management mechanisms introduced by state sponsored environmental policy 
initiatives, such as the notification of SSSIs and the use of publicly funded 
environmental management agreements. Ironically, the result has been that locally 
derived and administered principles of sustainable management have been replaced, 
in the modern law, by the use of  legal and policy instruments external to the local 
community, and  targeted to the delivery of ‘sustainable’ management in terms 
defined in national and EU environmental law and policy. Although the Commons 
Act 2006 seeks a return to the collective local management of the commons, this will 
take place (if at all) within a property rights framework that has ceased to have any 
meaningful role in delivering sustainable management. One of the primary functions 
of commons councils will be to promote the ecologically sustainable management of 
the commons, based on principles derived externally to the local community and 
driven largely by the imperatives of European Union nature conservation law.  
 
 
.   
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